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Содержание №40 2021

Психологические исследования

Романова Е. С., Рыжов Б. Н., Котова О. В. Половозрастные особенности самооценки антропоцентрических видов мотивации
Бреусенко-Кузнецов А. А. Гносеология психоанализа: натуралистическое, структуральное, феноменологическое, экзистенциальное истолкования
Волкова Е. Н. Институты социализации современных подростков и их влияние на подростковый буллинг: системный анализ
Алексеенко М. С. Роль формальных и неформальных оценок в системном анализе летной подготовки
Волков И. В., Исаева О. М. Возможности теории самодетерминации для изучения организационного поведения
Васечко Е. П., Кононова Т. А. Системная оценка стрессоустойчивости курсантов военных институтов
Урунтаева Г. А. Психология нравственного развития в детстве в творчестве Леонида Андреева

История психологии и психология истории

Иванов Д. В. Системно-психологические идеи в творчестве Н. К. Михайловского


Сведения об авторах журнала «Системная психология и социология», 2021, № 4 (40)
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G. Simons,

The Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies (CATS)

at the Swedish Defence University, Stockholm


The article focuses on tangible threats through intangible means in the framework of broader agenda of information and communication security of BRICS.

Keywords: BRICS; intangible threats; brand; reputation; information security; communication security.



Wars are being increasingly fought by alternative means, where there is not a formal declaration of war, the use of proxy forces, the leading role of information and communication in the conflict. The boundaries between war and peace are increasingly blurred. In technical jargon this can be referred to as full spectrum warfare, in a current popular parlance, it is hybrid war. It is important to try and understand the nature and procedure of how an actor can attack the intangible assets of a target organisation/country in order to bring about and realise foreign policy objectives through the use of subversion of another actor’s sovereign information space.

The global geopolitical landscape is currently in state of flux and change. Although the United States (US) saw itself as the winner of the Cold War and was the last superpower left standing with unrivalled economic and military might these advantages are in a gradual state of decline. This situation, however, does not mean that it is an accepted fate, which is witnessed by the increasingly self-destructive actions (contrary to actual concepts of US national interests and national security) around the world, and especially related to an increasing use of regime change to eliminate obstacles and rivals. The Colour Revolutions and the Arab Spring illustrate the potential destructive power of offensive information and communication on target states.

A number of states (such as China and Russia) and international organisations (for example BRICS) challenge the global hegemony of the US. States that challenge or stand up to the US can become targets of subversion, such as Cuba, Iran and Venezuela. BRICS and/or individual member states can also find themselves in this situation. From a theoretical and conceptual perspective, how could an attack on the informational and communicational security of a target appear?

This paper shall begin with analysing the role played by news production, which is used to serve as an instrument of foreign policy. It prepares the narrative for the domestic and international audience, which also doubles as a means for initiating a spiral of silence on events and key people (by restricting the perceived and permissible boundaries of discussion and conversation on the issue). The next section discusses the role of power and subversion in politics. It seeks to detail the means and mechanisms of subverting an opponent by attacking an opponent/target’s intangible assets (reputation, credibility and brand), bringing about a crisis that witnesses a split in society between the elite and the masses, and among the elite, ultimately setting the stage for what seems like a ‘popular’ regime change. Finally, a SWOT analysis of BRICS is briefly conducted in order to identify potential for informational and communicational attack by external forces.

Operationalising News as an Instrument of Foreign Policy

There are two sides to the use of information in a geopolitical context – defensive and offensive. A defensive use of information involves countering the target’s offensive narrative and messaging and defending one’s own brand and reputation. The offensive use of information involves projecting one’s own narrative into the target’s information space and attacking the opponent’s brand and reputation. This is very much an informational battle of perception, the success of which is dependent upon the credibility of the messenger and the penetration of the message. The intention is to create a crisis situation, although a threat to the target, it is an opportunity for others. Ultimately, the ability or inability to control the informational flows will have a direct impact upon the operational aspects of the crisis and its eventual outcome. News is seen as a potential tool with which to shape audiences, to shape their perceptions and opinions in order to support a certain policy or agenda.

Primarily, however, the engineer of consent must create news. News is not an inanimate thing. It is the overt act that makes news, and news in turn shapes the attitudes and actions of people. A good criterion as to whether something is or is not news is whether the event juts out of the pattern of routine. The developing of events and circumstances that are not routine is one of the basic functions of the engineer of consent.Newsworthy events, involving people, usually do not happen by accident. They are planned deliberately to accomplish a purpose, to influence our ideas and actions [2: p. 119]. Here Bernays makes it clear that there is nothing random or neutral in the production of news, it serves a purpose, which is to support certain political objectives and policy through carefully ‘massaging’ public opinion. A later author noted that there is a “trend tword presentation of propaganda in the form of news through regular news channels” and he predicted that “this trend can be expected to continue in the future”[16: p. 12]. Entman notes that “public opinion cannot be divorced from the political discourse and media frames that surround it. The apparent impact of the public on government policy often arises from a circular process in which government officials respond to the polling opinions, anticipated or perceived majorities, and priorities that many of them helped to create” [6: p. 142]. Public opinion is highly coveted for the reason that it can be used in an instrumental sense in achieving the priorities and goals of the communicator. It may seem like a straight forward proposition, but in order to influence public opinion, an approach is needed in order to create an adequate political information environment in which to incubate it.

Public opinion is a construction: of governments, of the media, and of everyday conversation influenced by government and the media. It is accepted and treated as though it were an objective reality to be discovered by polling or otherwise taking account of expressed beliefs and assumed beliefs about public policy. But it reflects and echoes the claims of officials and of reports in the media respecting developments or alleged developments in the news. Dramatic news reports and interpretations of events and non-events are routinely deployed to evoke concern, anger, relief, and beliefs in general, and these are then labelled public opinion [5: p. 53].

As is seen above, shaping public opinion is an art that requires a specific and accurate approach to news telling. Words and images are used in a deliberate manner in order to try and induce the desired emotional state that is likely to stimulate the desired response to the event being depicted. To be able to bring about this situation, the aspects of magnitude (in terms of prominence and repetition) and cultural resonance must be considered. Words and images need to be “highly salient in the culture, which is to say noticeable, understandable, memorable and emotionally charged” [6: p. 6]. New information communication technologies play an increasingly significant role in the type and nature of news, and in the means to influence audiences. This enables the projection of strongly emotional material and themes, especially with regards to mobilising and/or rallying “global consciousness” and “moral actors” on the world stage. “The admonition to “think globally” has undeniable ethical overtones: that we are part of one world whose condition should concern us all” [3: p. 7]. At its most basic point, this exercise is one of enacting influence on a target audience.

The specific influence brought about by news framing and narratives on a certain issue may be found in opinion, but also issue salience. Opinion is merely one of the aspects, issue salience is no less importance, which is related to not how an audience thinks about an issue, but what issue audiences think about. Therefore, the use of news reporting can focus attention (agenda-setting) on a given foreign policy issue and prime the given audience in terms of expectation management (of ‘inevitability’ and outcomes) [8; 9; 17; 22; 23; 26].

Use of Subversion and Power in Politics[2]

What is power? Seemingly it is a simple question, but it is in fact, very difficult to answer. Many people talk about power, but there are variable definitions. It is one of those things that is much easier to experience than to define or be able to accurately measure. Nye defines power as “the ability to influence the behaviour of others to get the outcomes one wants” [14: p. 2]. There are two different paths to achieving power, through the use of attraction or the use of coercion. Owing to the nature of the topic of this paper, the path using coercion is more appropriate. Coercive or command power relies on the use of demands “to change [my] preferences and do what you want by threatening [me] with force or economic sanctions” [14: p. 6]. Power involves the use of persuasion as a means to achieve a desired goal or objective. Anthony Lake, former National Security Advisor to President Clinton, stated that the US diplomatic responses to conflicts can be classifiedinto two categories: as honest broker and powerful broker [11: p. 116]. An honest broker is defined as relying on reason, patience and non-coercion. Meanwhile a powerfulbroker relies on the use of force, and by the implied logic is consequently less patient and sincere. It is about the ability to persuade another actor.

Persuasion is a commonly heard and key element in the process, however, it still requires further elaboration. It involves five different components: 1) It is a symbolic process, 2) in which people persuade themselves, 3) which involves an attempt to influence and 4) the transmission of a message, and 5) which requires free choice [15: p. 12-15]. In terms of impact, persuasion can be used for three broad effects. One effect is to shape attitudes and opinions on something. A second use is to reinforce attitudes and opinions in an audience. The third effect is to changeattitudes and opinions [15: p. 24-25]. This is achieved through the control of a two-way flow of information. “The most successful movements simultaneously seek information about their targets while managing facts about themselves” [3: p. 52]. There may in fact be different publics that need to be segmented as there may be incompatible goals between the different publics, for example an international public and a foreign government. The goal may be to garner support for regime change (although formulated in a more palatable and diplomatic form) among the international public, and to try and limit the perceived options available to a foreign government. There has been a refinement of tactics used in regime change that try to reduce the overall perception of deep rooted national interests in the process of regime change, which uses a variety of different state and non-state actors as well as international and domestic (in the target country). Keck and Sikkink make an interesting observation in the opening of their book on transnational advocacy networks.

World politics at the end of the 20th century involves, alongside states, many non-state actors that interact with each other, with states, and with international organisations. These interactions are structured in terms of networks, and transnational networks are increasingly visible in international politics [10: p. 1].

The authors have an upbeat assessment of this new form of advocacy, which they associate with positive changes in international politics within such areas as human rights and the environment. They note that “advocacy networks are helping to transform the practice of national sovereignty” [10: p. 2]. However, these networks can and are used for other purposes as well, by eroding the concept and strength of national sovereignty, it potentially exposes a targeted country to informational attack for the purposes of regime change.

A broad coalition of actors is involved in the process of advocacy, but are controlled and directed from a central point and by common practices. In their study on the role and activity of transnational advocacy networks, Keck and Sikkink, identify a number of similarities among diverse networks and causes. “Despite their differences, these networks are similar in several important respects: the centrality of values or principled ideas, the belief that individuals can make a difference, the creative use of information, and the employment by non-governmental actors of sophisticated political strategies in targeting their campaigns” [10: p. 2]. These groups often work in issues areas where there is high value content and informational uncertainty. Information exchange is a central aspect in their relationships, which is used to mobilise informational strategically in order to persuade, pressure and influence their target group [10: p. 2]. These groups seek to influence the political environment by trying to use the implementation of certain norms and values as leverage.

In some regards, a political ideological tone can be detected in the various revolutionary waves that have witnessed regime change (Colour Revolutions and Arab Spring for example). There seems to be inherent in the overarching narrative a clash between grand ideologies, “each of which presented a totalistic view of the world offering perspectives on how society should be organised” [19: p. 111]. This is clear in the frame where the political ideology of democracy/liberalism is projected as being superior to the stated or suggested oppositional political ideology of authoritarianism (this does not mean to say that the opposing side are authoritarian, but rather framed as being so).

Even if one regime is toppled and is replaced by another regime type that is rhetorically standing for democracy and against authoritarianism, there is no certainty of participatory democracy taking placing owing to external actors spoiling the scenario. “The process of democracy is often co-opted into programmes of polyarchy and neoliberalism by the United States and international financial organisations so as to prevent popular democracy from taking root” [18]. However, this relates to unarmed revolutions that are used against a political regime. What happened in Kiev in early 2014 was something else, more akin to the notion of revolutionary warfare.

Revolutionary warfare employs ancient military tactics in conjunction with political and psychological techniques in order to acquire political power as a prelude to transforming the social structure. […] Revolutionary warfare strategists combine unconventional military tactics with political and psychological operations in order to establish a competing political and ideological structure [21: p. 113].

There are tangible elements present in this type of political violence, however, perhaps of greater importance are the intangible elements. Brute force is but one aspect, the psychological aspect is of greater significance and importance to the outcome of the struggle. Shultz named five principles in revolutionary warfare – primacy of propaganda and political action; mass mobilisation; establishment of a political and military infrastructure; military and paramilitary tactics; and acquisition of outside assistance [21: p. 114-117]. Subversion is the art of being able to turn the intangible into the tangible. Lawrence Beilenson, a friend of Ronald Reagan, once described Vladimir Lenin as being a Prophet of Power. “He grasped the opportunity by translating words into deeds to become the foremost theorist-practitioner of subversion. His employment of the tool was shaped by his character, ideology, and theory of power” [1: p. 3]. This is only half the picture though, the other half is found in the capacity and actions of the target government.

Beilenson also noted that “the capability of the subversive tool – like that of any weapon – depends partly on the capacity of its target to resist. A one-time subverter can concentrate on the particular strengths and weaknesses of the target government he wants to topple” [1: p. 13]. In addition to the characteristics of a political regime’s institutional and ideological vulnerabilities, there is another aspect that needs to be considered as well – that of timing. There are different moments when a regime is either more or less vulnerable to subversion and overthrow. “The unpredictability of place and time of overthrow is a collar of the general rule that particular foresight is generally fallible. Experience illustrates the application of the rule to economics, war, and international politics”[1: p. 28]. The planners of a coup or revolution can take advantage of the state’s reaction (especially concerning police and security forces), which in some senses has been compared to a ‘machine’ insofar as it behaves in a fairly predictable and automatic manner [12: p. 21]. Insurrections and rebellions are unpredictable events that can go in a number of different directions on account of different variables.

There are, however, a number of common factors that can be used to create the ‘right’ conditions and environment to initiate insurrection against a government. Luttwak proposed at least three conditions that needed to be simultaneously present. 1) “Severe and prolonged economic crisis, with large-scale unemployment or run-away inflation; 2) a long and unsuccessful war or a major defeat, military or diplomatic; 3) chronic instability under a multi-party system [12: p. 31]. Lenin identified four elements that are needed – 1) foreign assistance to government or dissidents; 2) shifting immediate local grievances, in which underlying causes of discontent become particularised; 3) the failure or success of temporarily uniting diffuse dissident factions during an uprising; 4) the level of loyalty or disaffection in the security forces [1: p. 44]. Luttwak also notes, when a political regime (regardless of whether it is democratic or not) keeps open a channel for active dialogue, the chances of creating an environment of being overthrown are reduced [12: p. 29]. These are the necessary domestic conditions that are required in order to begin the process.

Information and communication is selectively used to resonate with the potential aspirations and fears of the target audience, which can have the effect of seducing and then mobilising the targeted population [24]. By attacking the intangible elements of a target population and its leaders, it is hoped to create fissures in society as civilians lose belief in their political leadership, their will to fight or resist. Armed forces and security force personnel lose their belief in the political and institutional leadership and are therefore less likely to fight or may even change sides [22]. Therefore intangible communication can have a direct impact upon the tangible operational environment. The significance of informational security is clear – “the 21st century is the age of information when information becomes an important strategic resource. The information obtaining, processing, and security guarantee capability are playing critical roles in comprehensive national power, and information security is related to the national security and stability” [20: p. 273]. Information security is linked to national security and social stability, which is the target of those that seek foreign policy courses that include regime change.

According to Stephen Walt there are a number of common elements and outcomes to revolutions. “First, revolutions become possible when the administrative and coercive capacities of the state have been weakened by a combination of internal and external challenges.” Second, there is a rapid outburst of political activity. In mass revolutions, this is often carried out by individuals or groups that are marginalised. Third, the language of political discourse is altered and new symbols and social customs are nurtured. Fourth, the means and principles with which leaders are chosen are changed, they are drawn from the groups that were formerly excluded and now exclude members of the old regime. Fifth, violence is normally the method of revolution, and struggles between competing groups continue after the ouster of the regime [25: p. 35]. There are also external factors at play in subversion, which need to be taken into account.

When the subversion is directed from external sources, there are three distinct strategic characteristics. 1) “It was mainly auxiliary to war being waged or expected to come. 2) Decisive external subversion was always geographically spotty (i.e. not global). 3) In the particular country to be subverted, decisive external subversion was normally conducted in an opportunist manner” [1: p. 90]. There is coordination needed between the external sponsors and the domestic executors of the political power seizure. This is particularly important in shaping the external image and portrayal of those subverting a government, and in attempting to shape international public perception in order to try and mobilise support for the act and to condemn the target government and its actions.

Upon the successful seizure of power, there are two primary principles that are pursued by those that have taken political control. The first point is the need for a rapid transformation of and in society to take place, but simultaneously cloaked in anonymity so as to not alienate or mobilise any potential opposition. Secondly, is that all opposition in the form of armed formations needs to be crushed quickly [12: p. 58]. Otherwise weaknesses may emerge that can be exploited by competing groups.


A SWOT Analysis of BRICS

What are the Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats for BRICS in relation to the information detailed above? However, it is necessary to summarise some key points first. It is the task of the attacker to shape the attitudes and opinions of the target in order for them to behave in a manner that benefits their agenda. Whereas the defender must vary between reinforcing or changing (if the attacker succeeds in shaping them) the public attitudes and opinions. This is fought on a perceptual level, and which involves the use of emotional (rather than reasoned) logic.

It is the intention of the attacker to drive a wedge between the rulers and the ruled, and also among the rulers. The elite in society are generally held together by common sets of interests. So long as these hold, the group remains a unified and cohesive force. When the common interests disappear so does the unity and the group may split. This was witnessed in the Orange Revolution, when the Orange side were victorious against the Blue side there reason for remaining together (the defeat of Viktor Yanukovich) disappeared and the result was political infighting among the leading personalities of this group.

The forces that bind the mass level of society are different, and tend to be more emotional rather than pragmatic in nature. This segment of society are kept together through a sense of shared identity and purpose, which is expressed through symbolism – values, norms, flags, national anthems, sport, culture … etc. Their sense of identity and belonging needs to be reinforced through the appearance of active participation in the society to which they originate in order to establish a sense having an active stake in building/maintaining that society.

BRICS represents an early stage of a political-economic development that challenges the established status quo of world politics and economics that favour and therefore give advantage to the US. The brand and reputation of BRICS is not necessarily the sum of all of the individual members. To project a viable good brand and reputation, strategic communication and strategy of the members and BRICS must align in words and deeds. One good institutional step to realise this goal came about in March 2013 at the 5th BRICS summit in South Africa with the establishment of the BRICS Business Council. The goals of this organisation are clearly communicated.


 Promote and strengthen business, trade, and investment ties amongst the business communities of the five BRICS countries; 

 Ensure that there is regular dialogue between the business communities of the BRICS nations and the Governments of the BRICS countries; and

 Identify problems and bottlenecks to ensure greater economic, trade and investment ties amongst the BRICS countries and recommend solutions accordingly.[3][4].

The strength of BRICS is reliant upon the values, positioning and goals of the project. In terms of market positioning, it is located as a competitor to the US dominated global order, which resonates with those publics that are dissatisfied with the status quo of world politics and economics. It is also a new brand, which means effective communication (goals and strategies) and actions (concrete results) can solidify the reputation and brand of the organisations. This is also going to be somewhat dependant on the expressed goals and values of BRICS resonating with a wider audience (than solely BRICS countries).

One of the weaknesses is found in the recent establishment of the organisation, which does not have an established brand or reputation, which means that it potentially runs the risk of getting ‘brand-jacked’ by aggressive communication. Certainly looking at the diet of Western news on BRICS and its individual member countries, the general tone of the reporting is dismissive and more linked to agenda-setting, priming and influencing the publics.[4] [7].This means that there needs to be close monitoring of media tone, content and timing as a possible early warning indicator. It needs to be kept in mind, although some regime changes and coups are planned in advance, there are others which are spontaneous in execution.

Another potential weakness can be found in the fact that there are to five different sets of national interests within the organisation. This potentially allows for a hostile external actor to bring about political division between the member states and render the functioning of the collective organisation. There needs to be a rigorous system of frank and open communication regime between the individual members.

An opportunity exists through BRICS to attract soft power by projecting and creating a fairer and just system of global political and economic relations, which if successful, shall potentially attract the participation of further member and those who may wish to emulate the system. If economic growth and prosperity can be achieved in a general global environment of economic stagnation and downturn, further opportunities will emerge, which should be quickly acted upon. The process of building via political and economic relationships takes time and effort to create and maintain.

The primary threat is for an external actor to inflict damage on the intangible elements of BRICS as an organisation and of the individual member states. If anything, the Colour Revolutions provide a vivid example of what can happen. Those countries (Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan) that had the emotional and psychological conditions that supported the attempts at regime change. They experienced political regimes that had lost a viable line of communication with their populations; they had experienced long-term economic upheaval and recession; Western media framing and narratives supported the ‘opposition’ and tied the hands of the government; support, training, logistics and communication supplied by foreign countries; election results were used to prime the local publics who were already discontent, creating an emotional logic; viable and recognisable slogans and symbols were used to politically mobilise the mass levels of society; attempts were made to divide the elites by only threatening to remove the national leader and not everyone, a divided elite is much more susceptible to subversion than a united one; security forces were either inactive or changed sides and joined the ‘opposition’.



In the introduction of this paper a question was posed. From a theoretical and conceptual perspective, how could an attack on the informational and communicational security of a target appear? There are a number of points that have emerged in the course of this paper, which point to some similarities in how full spectrum warfare/hybrid wars are waged. These are actions that occur in a blurred zone between war and peace, which has the effect of potentially restricting the available actions of a victim in defending themselves from such an attack.

A tell-tale sign that something is about to occur can be found in the news content and timing of the country that shall launch the attack. This is intended to serve as a subjective means of telling the audience what to think about, there is further reinforcement that coaches the international audience what opinions and attitudes they should hold based upon the values and norms that are woven in to the narratives and framing of the news. This is an example of defensive use of information as it is about securing and engineering the consent (and if possible the demand) for a certain pre-planned course of foreign policy. It is used to give the appearance of legitimacy to a powerful broker. Communication should precede the actual physical act of regime change or coup.

The logic used is an emotional one, not logical, which is based upon competing sets of values and norms. There is also the involvement of non-state actors, which serve as proxies and a basis of plausible denial by the aggressor. The intention is to erode the concept and strength of national sovereignty. Information and perception are both key to the success or failure of these operations. On the one hand, there needs to be shared information and coordination between the various attackers. They also need to be able to disrupt the communication credibility and possibilities of their target, which is made much easier if the target does not have a viable and open form of communication with its own population. Emotions are the most effective primer in these events – in terms of attaining or avoiding a certain situation or state of being. This does not need to be true, but it does need to be believed.

Attacks are made against the intangible aspects of the existing political and social structure, which is brought to a crescendo by provoking a crisis (where the simultaneous elements of threat to values, uncertainty and time constraint exist). This crisis is then used as a basis for a political call for action (at the national and international levels) that is likely to fulfil the foreign policy plans and objectives of the supporting foreign power. The preparatory informational campaign run through the news content has conditioned publics into a certain line of thinking and opinion and therefore restricted the permissible bounds of discussion and description. Once the brand and reputation of the target government is damaged by such an attack, it also has the effect of compromising their ability to respond in an operational capacity. This represents the offensive use of an informational attack, to project one’s own narrative into the target’s population and to reduce the effectiveness of the target government’s communications to its population and the international community.



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Г. Саймонс,

Центр изучения ассиметричных угроз

Шведского университета обороны,

Стокгольм, Швеция


Ключевые слова:БРИКС; нематериальные активы; бренд; репутация; информационная безопасность; коммуникационная безопасность.


Некоторые страны (такие как Китай и Россия) и международные объединения (например, БРИКС) бросают вызов глобальной гегемонии Соединенных Штатов Америки. Государства, которые противостоят США, могут стать мишенью подрывных действий, как это случилось с Кубой, Ираном или Венесуэлой. В такой же ситуации может оказаться БРИКС или отдельные его государства-члены. Рассмотрим с теоретической и концептуальной точки зрения, как может развиваться атака на информационную и коммуникационную безопасность мишени.

Задача атакующего сформировать установки и мнения «мишени» таким образом, чтобы они отвечали его целям. Защитник же, наоборот, должен маневрировать, заботясь об укреплении или изменении своих установок в общественном сознании (последнее если они успешно сформированы атакующим). Это борьба на уровне восприятия, которая в большей мере использует логику эмоций (а не логику мышления).

Цель нападающего вбить клин между правителями и управляемыми, а также между самими правителями. Элита в обществе обычно сплочена на основе общих интересов. Пока они сохраняются, группа остается единой и сплоченной силой. Когда общие интересы исчезают, исчезает и сплоченность, что чревато распадом группы. Это подтверждает Оранжевая революция, в которой «оранжевая» сторона победила «синюю», после чего общая цель (поражение Виктора Януковича) исчезла, и результатом стала политическая борьба среди ведущих сил внутри победившей группы.

БРИКС представляет собой находящееся на ранней стадии развития политико-экономическое формирование, которое бросает вызов сложившемуся статус-кво в мировой политике и экономике, дающему преимущество США.

 Бренд и репутация БРИКС не обязательно представляют сумму брендов и репутаций всех отдельных членов. Чтобы спроектировать жизнеспособный хороший бренд и репутацию, стратегическая коммуникация, а также стратегии государств-членов и самой БРИКС должны быть синхронизированы в словах и делах.

Сила БРИКС базируется на ценностях, позиционировании и целях проекта. С точки зрения позиционирования на рынке, БРИКС является конкурентом мировому порядку, в котором доминируют США. Проект БРИКС находит отклик у той части общественности, которая недовольна status-quo. Это также новый бренд, который означает эффективные коммуникации (цели и стратегии) и действия (конкретные результаты), которые могут укрепить репутацию и бренд объединения. Также БРИКС обещает стать проектом, зависящим от провозглашенных целей и ценностей, разделяемых более широкой аудиторией (а не только в странах БРИКС).

Одной из слабых сторон БРИКС является недавний срок образования объединения, у которого еще нет сформировавшегося бренда или репутации. Это означает, что БРИКС потенциально рискует столкнуться с «похищением» своего бренда в результате агрессивной коммуникации противников. Определенно, оценивая направленность западных новостей о БРИКС и его отдельных государствах-членах, можно увидеть, что общий тон сообщений пренебрежителен, и более связан с политической конъюнктурой и задачами влияния на общественное мнение. Очевидно, что в БРИКС должен быть налажен тщательный мониторинг тона, содержания, распределения эфирного времени сообщений средств массовой информации. Такой мониторинг может стать индикатором раннего предупреждения угроз. Это нужно иметь в виду, хотя некоторые изменения режима и перевороты планируются заранее, а некоторые осуществляются стихийно.

 Еще одна потенциальная слабость заключается в том, что в рамках объединения представлено до пяти разных наборов национальных интересов. Это потенциально позволяет враждебной внешней силе спровоцировать политическое разделение государств-членов и застопорить функционирование объединения. Противодействие этой угрозе требует налаживания строгой системы открытой и общедоступной коммуникации между отдельными членами БРИКС.

В БРИКС существует возможность привлечь «мягкую силу», спроектировав и создав более честную и справедливую систему глобальных политических и экономических отношений, которая в случае успеха, привлечет новых членов и тех, кто может последовать примеру объединения. Если в глобальной обстановке экономической стагнации и спада БРИКС сможет достичь экономического роста и процветания, появятся дальнейшие возможности, на которые нужно быстро реагировать. Процесс выстраивания новой системы через политические и экономические отношения требует времени и усилий для своего формирования и поддержания.

Основная угроза, исходящая от внешних акторов, — угроза ущерба нематериальным активам БРИКС как объединения, а также его отдельных членов. Во всяком случае «цветные революции» — яркий пример того, что может произойти. Те страны (Украина, Грузия и Кыргызстан), в которых сложились соответствующие эмоциональные и психологические условия, поддержали попытки смены режима. Они испытали на себе власть, которая утратила возможность жизнеспособной коммуникации с населением; они подверглись долговременным экономическим потрясениям и рецессии; фреймингу и нарративам западных СМИ, они поддержали «оппозицию» и связали руки существующим правительствам. Поддержка, обучение, материально-техническое обеспечение и коммуникация оппозиции обеспечивались зарубежными странами; результаты выборов были использованы, чтобы возмутить местную общественность (которая уже была недовольна), создав «логику эмоций»; эффектные и узнаваемые лозунги и символы использовались для политической мобилизации масс; были предприняты попытки раскола элит путем угроз устранить от власти только национального лидера, а не всю элиту. Расколотая элита намного более восприимчива к подрывной деятельности, чем объединенная. Силы безопасности или бездействовали, или перешли на сторону «оппозиции».

Нематериальные активы существующей политической и социальной структуры подвергаются атакам, которые становятся все интенсивнее, провоцируя кризис там, где одновременно существуют элементы угроз основным ценностям, нестабильность и недостаток времени для важных решений. Этот кризис затем используется как основание для политического призыва к действию (на национальном и международном уровнях), что, скорее всего, соответствует внешнеполитическим планам и целям иностранной державы, поддерживающей смену режима. Подготовительная информационная кампания, реализуемая через новостной поток, приводит общественность к определенной направленности мышления и мнений, чем ограничивает допустимые пределы обсуждения и описания происходящего.

Однажды нанеся ущерб бренду и репутации атакуемого правительства, противник добивается снижения способности этого правительства реагировать на угрозы, используя для этого все средства. Этим характеризуется наступательное использование информационной атаки, направленное на распространение своего собственного нарратива среди населения атакуемого государства, а также на уменьшение эффективности коммуникации атакуемого правительства с собственным населением и международным сообществом. В этой связи, предлагаются следующие рекомендации:

cтранам БРИКС нужна общедоступная и тщательно отлаженная форма коммуникации между государствами-членами, внутри этих государств, а также коммуникации с международным сообществом. Эти уровни коммуникации должны не только четко дать понять, что поддерживает БРИКС и его государства-члены с политической и экономической точки зрения, но и то, как страны БРИКС, его граждане и партнеры могут извлечь материальную и нематериальную выгоду из этих отношений;

для того чтобы реализовывать и придавать смысл собственной стратегии и стратегической коммуникации, а также синхронизировать слова и поступки, БРИКС нужно разработать четкие и позитивные бренд и репутацию в международном сообществе. Это должно помочь, если организация отчетливо позиционирует себя на мировом рынке политических и экономических идей как гарант статус-кво, нишевой игрок или тот, кто бросает статус-кво вызов. Декларируемые ценности и нормы должны поддерживать идею бренда и искомую им репутацию;

как БРИКС в целом, так и ее государства-члены должны принять во внимание материальные и нематериальные условия, которые создают окружающую среду, позволяющую иностранным державам начать подрывную деятельность в отношении социальной и политической системы организации. Эти угрозы, соответственно, должны быть вовремя минимизированы.


Чтобы сформировать большее чувство сплоченности, БРИКС должен продолжать создавать, продвигать и поддерживать взаимопонимание между политическими и экономическими элитами, четкую общую цель и видение, устойчивые и выгодные в долгосрочной перспективе. Краткосрочные цели и задачи не могут поддержать эту сплоченность, так как общая логика действий и цель могут исчезнуть. Управление широкими массами требует эмоциональных вложений, сопряженных с рисками. Общество должно чувствовать, что оно принимает участие в самом политическом процессе и получении и использовании его результатов, что возможно не просто при коммуникации с обществом, но и при активном его участии в делах объединения.

[1] Статья предоставлена профессором философского факультета МГУ им. М. В. Ломоносова, доктором исторических наук, профессором Е. Н. Пашенцевым.

[2] The terms coup, insurrection and revolution are at times used to describe the action of an illegal seizure of political power by forces that use means other than a democratic vote. Their origin of use is related to the respective author of the theoretical material being consulted and quoted.

[3] BRICS Business Council, Indian Chapter, http://www.bricsbusinesscouncil.in/htm/bbc.html, (accessed 21 October 2015)

[4]Ghosh, J., Is the Game Up for China’s Much Emulated Growth Model?, The Guardian, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/aug/23/china-growth-model-brics, 23 August 2015 (accessed 21 October 2015)